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THE LIABILITY OF CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS FOR
TORTS OF AGENTS AND SERVANTS
By EDWARD MNI. BALL"
Mr. I. S. Sick, a patient at Memorial Hospital, is severely
burned when a nurse employed by the hospital negligently places
hot water bottles against his body before wrapping them in
flannel. The process of wrapping hot water bottles is a standard
procedure prescribed by the rules of the hospital. Mrs. Sick was
visiting her husband when she slipped and fell on a freshly
waxed hallway F Hall, a janitor, had applied the wax on the
hall floor but had forgotten to put out signs as required by the
hospital rules indicating a dangerous condition. Memorial
Hospital is a nonprofit corporation owned and operated by a
benevolent society which has dedicated the hospital to the better-
ment of the health of the community Its expenses are paid in
part by fees which are charged to patients who are financially
able to pay part or all of their fees, but fees charged the paying
patients are not fixed with the idea of the paying patients carry-
ing the entire financial burden of the Memorial Hospital. -r.
Sick is a financially responsible and able person who has been
paying the full charges as fixed by Memorial Hospital for his
eare and treatment. A goodly portion of the financial burden
of the hospital is met by voluntary contributions and also by in-
come from certain trusts created solely for the purpose of supply-
ing income to the hospital. At times Memorial Hospital has
shown a profit, which profit is put right back into the hospital
for the purpose of expansion and medical scholarships for the
research laboratory of the hospital. The Gibraltar Assurance
Association has issued an insurance policy to Memorial Hospital
wherein the Association has agreed to pay any loss of the in-
sured to the extent of the latter's legal liability Mr. and MVrs.
Sick, as individuals, sue Memorial Hospital for the injuries which
each has received as the result of the negligent acts of the nurse
and janitor. Both parties plaintiff are willing to stipulate that
": B.S., Ball State Teachers; LL.B., Indiana University; Asst.
Professor of Law, University of San Francisco School of Law.
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the admimstration of Memorial Hospital has used due care m the
selection and employment of both the nurse and the janitor.
What result I
Were this question to be submitted to the judiciary of the
several states, a myriad of variant opinions would be rendered.
"Paradoxes of principle, fictional assumptions of fact and con-
sequence, and confused results characterize judicial disposition
of these claims. "1
It is not the purpose of this article to survey all the case
law of this country and England, for to do so would require more
space than seems warranted. The decisions range from com-
plete immunity from tort liability to virtually complete liability
with a gradient of sometimes fine distinctions and exceptions in
between. An attempt will be made to present the more basic
rules and the reasons therefor.
Private corporations, trustees of private trusts, administra-
tors and executors have always been held liable for negligence,
either by reason of such personal misconduct on the part of the
officer, trustee, etc., or based upon the principle of respondeat
superzor 2 Should liability be any the less because the corpora-
tion is a charitable one or because a trustee is administering a
charitable trust 9
In 1846, Lord Cottenham stated "To give damages out of a
trust fund would not be to apply it to those objects whom the
author of the fund had in view, but would be to divert it to a
completely different purpose." 3 Although dictum,4 the language
1 President and Directors of Georgetown College v Hughes, 130
F 2d 810, 812 (App. D.C. 1942) containing an excellent discussion of
this problem.
'Respondeat Superior doctrine-applicable to corporate liabil-
ity, STEVENS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS,
(1936) § 78; HARPER, LAW OF TORTS (1933) § 293. Doctrine applied to
agents or servants of a trustee: RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS, § 264 (1935).
" under the principle of respondeat superior, torts, commit-
ted by the agents or servants of the trustee in the course of the
administration of the trust subject the trustee to liability to the same
extent as though he were not a trustee (see RESTATEMENT, AGENCY,
§ § 212-267) The principle of respondeat superior is applicable al-
though the trustee receives no benefit from the trust." Comment b.
of § 264. See discussion on this point in 2 SCOTT, TRUSTS (1939) § 264;
LORINa, A TRUSTEE'S HANDBOOK, Shattuck revision (1940) § 88, 3
(Part 2) BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1946) § 732.
'The Feoffees of Heriot's Hospital v. Ross (1846) 12 Clark & F
507, 513, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508, 1510.
' Plaintiff alleged that he was a candidate for admission to the
charitable hospital under the terms of the testator's will, which will
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of the case has been picked up by many states' courts in this
country and applied to personal injury actions brought against
charities, particularly those administered by the so-called
"charitable corporations." Strong as the language of Lord
Cottenham may appear to be, the doctrine of the case was later
repudiated5 in England and today it may be stated that England
applies the doctrine of respondeat saperor with regard to the
tort liability of charitable institutions.6
What are the reasons for making these fine distinctions with
regard to tort liability as between charitable institutions and
institutions conducted for profit' There are four rather basic
reasons for the granting of immunity, either complete or partial,
two of which have already been noted. These four are
(1) as stated in the Herzot's Hospital case, 7 to permit a recovery
of damages against a trust fund would divert those funds from
purposes for which they were originally given. This theory is
commonly called the "trust fund theory", (2) the doctrine of
rispontdeat superior is not applicable to charitable institutions,
(3) as distinguished from a stranger to the charity, one who ac-
cepts benefits from the charity impliedly waives any claim to
damages which may result from the negligent acts of agents or
.servants of the iistitution, and (4) public policy in fostering
donations to charitable institutions-possible donors are supposed
to be more inclined to give when they know that their gifts will
not be used to satisfy actions for personal injuries. (What price
public policy') It is to be noted that in many respects theories
one and four are virtually the same.
directed that the residue of the testator's estate be used to erect and
maintain a hospital for the "poor fatherless boys" of the community
and for their relief and education. He asked the court to grant him
admission and for damages. The action was not one for damages as
result of injuries, rather one for the wrongful exclusion from the
benefits of a charity.
"Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs (1866) 11 H.L. 686 wherein
Lord Westbury stated that "Trustees may render the property of
their beneficiaries liable to third persons for an act done by them
in the exercise of their trust."
" Collins v. Hertfordshire County Council (1947) K.B. 598
wherein a hospital was held liable for maitainmg a negligent sys-
tem as to administration of drugs and for negligence of resident
house surgeon and pharmacist, but not for negligence of operating
surgeon, an independent contractor. Noted in 63 L. Q. REV. 410
(1947)1Supra, note 3.
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Illinois has been one of the states most consistently using the
trust fund theory in according full immunity without regard to
whether the plaintiff is a beneficiary or a stranger to the
charity 8 The immunity of charitable institutions had been so
absolute m Illinois that if the institution carried liability insur-
ance the plaintiff could not recover even to the extent of the in-
surance proceeds9 yet a later case held that if the charitable in-
stitution carried insurance the defense of immunity is not
available. 10
Massachusetts, in 1876,11 adopted the early English rule of
complete immunity In a later case the plaintiff attempted a
distinction between due care in the selection of servants or agents
and negligence of the managers in selecting incompetent subordi-
S Parks v Northwestern University (1905) 218 Ill. 381, 75 N.E.
991 "The funds and property thus acquired are held in trust, and
cannot be diverted to the purpose of paying damages for injuries
caused by the negligent or wrongful acts of its servants and em-
ployees to persons who are enjoying the benefit of the charity. An
institution of this character, doing charitable work of great benefit
to the public without profit, and depending upon gifts, donations,
legacies, and bequests made by charitable persons for the successful
accomplishment of its beneficial purposes, is not to be hampered in
the acquisition of property and funds from those wishing to con-
tribute and assist in the charitable work, by any doubt that might
arise in the minds of such intending donors as to whether the funds
supplied by them will be applied to the purposes for which they in-
tended to devote them, or diverted to the entirely different purposes
of satisfying judgments recovered against the donee because of the
negligent acts of those employed to carrying the beneficient purpose
into execution." Immunity applied with regard to suits brought by
strangers: Johnson v City of Chicago (1913) 258 Ill. 494, 101
N.E. 960.
9Piper v. Epstein (1945) 326 Ill. App. 400, 62 N.E. 2d 139 holding
that the reason for procuring the insurance is found in the policy re-
quiring the insurer tb investigate and defend all claims and actions
for damages, whether groundless or not, based on negligence of of-
ficers and agents of the hospital. Rule of Parks case was reiterated
and affirmed in Piper v. Epstein.
"
0 Wendt v. Servite Fathers (1947) 332 Ill. App. 618, 76 N.E. 2d
342, rehearing dented 12/29/47. Court stated that it felt bound to
apply the doctrine of the Parks case whenever the facts required
but that it was reluctant to extend the rule beyond the scope of
that case. It further found that there was nothing in the Parks case
which would justify the conclusion that the exemption from lia-
bility is absolute. In disposing of the Piper case (note 9) the court
stated "If the absolute immunity rule enunciated m the Piper case
were to prevail, it would seem a sheer waste of money for a chari-
table corporation to purchase insurance protection. We hold tat
where insurance exists and provides a fund from which tort lia-
bility may be collected so as not to impair the trust fund, the de-
fense of immunity is not available."
2 McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital (1876) 120 Mass.
432.
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nate agents, but the court disposed of the plaintiff's contention
by readopting the rule of absolute immunity 12 Certain excep-
tions must be noted to the Massachusetts rule where the charitable
institution was held liable when its property was not devoted to
its charitable purposes although the profits were devoted directly
to charitable purposes.13  Massachusetts thus makes a distinction
when the tort is committed in using property directly for
charitable purposes and when profits from the use of property
are charitably dispensed. It is submitted that this distinction
is more apparent than real, especially since the "profits" in
either situation are used exclusively for charitable purposes.
Further, some fact situations will pro ve exceedingly troublesome
to characterize one way or the other. As to the carrying of
liability insurance, Massachusetts accords with an earlier Illinois
view m that the charity's liability is not enlarged by reason of
such insurance. 14
Missouri holds to the doctrine of full immunity, making no
distinctions between actions brought by strangers or by bene-
ficiaries of the charity 15 A recent Missouri case treats the trust
fund theory and the one of public policy as virtually the same, 16
this being the contention of this writer. As to the effect of
'Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital (1920) 235 Mass. 66,
126 N.E. 392. Charity relieved from using due care in selecting
servants; Glaser v. Congregational Kehillath Israel (1928) 263 Mass.
435, 161 N.E. 619; Bearse v. New England Deaconess Hospital (1947)
321 Mass. 750, 72 N.E. 2d 743. Contra, Taylor v Flower Deaconess
Home and Hospital (1922) 104 Ohio St. 61, 135 N.E. 287; Hamburger
v. Cornell University (1925) 240 N.Y. 328, 148 N.E. 539. Positive duty
in both cases to use due care in the selection of employees. New
York holds that plaintiff has burden of proving that the duty was
disregarded.
" Holder v. Massachusetts Horticultural Society, (1912) 211
Mass. 370, 97 N.E. 630; McKay v Morgan Memorial Co-operative
Industries and Stores Inc. (1930) 272 Mass. 121, 172 N.E. 68; Reavey
v. Guild of St. Agnes (1933) 284 Mass. 300, 187 N.E. 557.
" McKay v. Morgan, etc., supra, note 12. Enman v Trustees of
Boston University (1930) 270 Mass. 299, 170 N.E. 43.
t
'Eads v. Y. W C. A. (1930) 325 Mo. 577, 29 S.W 2d 701, Roberts
v. Kirksville College of Osteopathy and Surgery (1929) (Mo. App.)
16 S.W 2d 625; Hope v. Barnes Hospital (1932) 227 Mo. App. 1055,
55 S.W 2d 319.
"Dille v. St. Luke's Hospital (1946) 355 Mo. 436, 196 S.W 2d
615, wherein the court stated "while the cases seem to treat the two
theories, trust fund and public policy, under separate heads, at
the bottom they are the same, the trust fund doctrine being as some
of the cases say, the 'child' or 'offspring' of the doctrine public
policy. This is also true as to the nonapplicabllity of the rule of
respondeat superior."
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liability insurance on the immunity of charitable institutions,
Missouri accords with Massachusetts. 17
Another state following the pattern of complete or absolute
immunity is that of Kentucky The courts of that state have
specifically adopted the trust fund theory,' 8 although several
opinions hold that virtually all of the theories are equally ten-
able. 19 An exception to the Kentucky rule should be noted where
a charitable institution of the state was held liable in damages
and enjoined from polluting a stream.20 Granted, that this was
not a personal injury case, yet the reasoning of the Kentucky
court in holding charities %xempt from liability under the trust
fund theory for personal injuries is equally fitted to the property
damage cases. Possibly this is, as one writer states, a "special or
unusual circumstance''2 1 that cannot be otherwise classified.
This state holds further that the procurement of an indemnity
insurance policy shall not affect the liability of the charity on the
hypothesis that no diversion of the trust funds would result.22
' Dille v St. Luke's Hosp., supra n. 16; Stedem v Jewish Me-
morial Hospital Association of Kansas City (1945) 239 Mo. App. 38,
187 S.W 2d 469.
'Emery v Jewish Hospital Association (1921) 193 Ky. 400, 236
S.W 577 wherein the majority opiion stated that "The diversion of
such funds in such a way would probably destroy the institution,
and a wise public policy forbids such a result." A strong dissent dis-
tinguished the liability of the charity to a patient from that to an
employee. The judge believed that the only feasible ground for ex-
tending immunity to be the implied waiver theory and even this
theory is doubtful to him. The dissent further suggested that the
whole doctrine of immunity is placed upon sentimental grounds
rather than reason and logic.
' Cook v. J. W Norton Memorial Hospital (1918) 180 Ky. 331,
202 S.W 874; Averback v Y. M. C. A. of Covington (1933) 250 Ky.
34, 61 S.W 2d 1066; Williams v Church Home (1928) 223 Ky. 355,
3 S.W 2d 753.
'Herr et al v. Kentucky Lunatic Asylum (1895) 97 Ky. 458, 30
S.W 971, same, 110 Ky. 282, 61 S.W 283 (1901)21Appleman, The Tort Liability of Charitable Institutions, 22
A.B.A.J. 48, 50 (1936).
' Williams v Church Home, supra note 19. Compare with Taylor
v. Knox County Board of Education (1942) 292 Ky 767, 167 S.W 2d
700, 145 A.L.R. 1333. In the Taylor case the court found that the in-
surance policy was not an indemnity policy but was a liability policy
issued for the benefit of injured third parties who may sue the in-
surer, the court stating " act does not make the board liable for
the torts of its agents and employees, but it does permit the board
to be sued and a judgment obtained which, when final, shall measure
the liability of the insurance carrier to the injured third party for
whose benefit the insurance policy was issued. In no event, of course,
can the 3udgment be collected out of school funds" (Italics supplied)
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In New York, the courts of that state have specifically
rejected the trust fund theory 23 Prior to 1937 a beneficiary of
the charity could not recover for personal injuries due to the
negligence of agents or servants of the charity except for the
failure to use due care in the selection of such incompetent per-
sons whereas strangers to the charity could recover the same as
under the usual rules as to tort liability .24 In 1937, the Court of
Appeals stated that the question was presented for the first time
in that court whether a charitable institution (not itself in de-
fault in the performance of any non-delegable duty) should be
declared exempt from liability to a beneficiary for personal in-
juries caused by the negligence of one acting as its mere servant
or enployee.25  A later ease held the New York rule to be that
4 4 it is now settled that even a charitable hospital is liable for
the acts of its servants." 0
In 1913 the Supreme Court of Minnesota declared that if
public policy requires a charity to be exempt from liability, the
pronouncement should be by the legislature and not by the
courts. " 7 A later case declared the Minnesota rule to cover the
A statute specifically provided that boards of education may set
aside funds to provide for liability and indemnity insurance against
negligence of the drivers and operators of school busses owned or
operated by the board.
- Hamburger v. Cornell University (1925) 240 N.Y. 328, 148
N.E. 539; Hodern v Salvation Army (1910) 199 N.Y. 233, 92 N.E.
626; Kellogg v. Church Charity Foundation of Long Island (1911)
203 N.Y. 191, 96 N.E. 406.
' Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital (1914) 211 N.Y.
125, 105 N.E. 92; Grawunder v Beth Israel Hospital Association et al
(1934) 272 N.Y.S. 171, Hamburger v. Cornell University, supra, note
23; Stearns v. Association of the Bar of New York (1934) 276 N.Y.S.
390.
, Sheehan v North Country Community Hospital et al (1937)
273 N.Y. 163, 7 N.E. 2d 28, the court stating "We think it would not
be a harmonious policy that would require this plaintaiff to put up
with her injuries on the score that appellant is a charitable hospital."
Plaintiff was a paying patient. Same, at 273 N.Y. 580, 7 N.E. 2d 701.
- Dillon v. Rockaway Beach Hospital and Dispensary (1940)
284 N.Y. 176, 30 N.E. 2d 373. Martucci et al. v Brooklyn Children's
Aid Society (C.C.A. 2d 1943) 133 F 2d 252. There are several New
York cases holding that the hospital is not liable on ground that the
employee was not an employee of the hospital but of the patient,
viz. a special nurse. Kaps v. Lenox Hill Hospital, 51 N.Y.S. 2d 791
(1944), aff'd. 269 App. Div. 830, 56 N.Y.S. 2d 415 (1945), Fisher v
Sydenham Hospital, Inc. (1941) 176 Misc. 7, 26 N.Y.S. 2d 389.
-qMcIrney v St. Luke's Hospital Association (1913) 122 Minn.
10, 141 N.W 837. Action by an employee against defendant hospital
for injuries received from unguarded machinery.
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entire field of tort liability, applying the rule to charities the
same as in the ease of individuals and private corporations, the
court in unequivocal language states its reasons thus
"To the person injured the loss is the same as though the
injury had been sustained in a private hospital for gain. In this
case the deceased paid for the services he expected, but this
may not be a controlling factor. We do not believe that a policy
of irresponsibility best subserves the beneficient purposes for
which the hospital is maintained. We do not approve the public
policy which would require the widow and children of deceased
rather than the corporation, to suffer the loss incurred through
the fault of the corporation's employees, or in other words, which
would compel the persons damaged to contribute the amount of
their loss to the purposes of even the most worthy corporation.
We are of the opinion that public policy does not favor exemp-
tions from liability '28 Later cases in Minnesota accord with
this view.
29
New Hampshire, at an early date, rejected the trust fund
theory as unsound,30 and a much later case has rejected all the
theories regarding immunity and placed charitable institutions
on the same basis as private corporations. 3i Oklahoma ap-
parently follows the rule as to no exemption from liability32 as
does Tennessee.3 3
Between these two poles lies a multitude of varying reasons
and policies for granting partial immunity The usual method is
to make a distinction between a stranger to the charity and one
receiving benefits therefrom, the charity being held liable under
the doctrine of respondeat superior to strangers and employees
2 Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein of Minnesota
District of German Evangelical Synod of North America (1920) 144
Minn. 392, 175 N.W 699.
'High v Supreme Lodge of the World, Loyal Order of Moose(1943) 214 Minn. 164, 7 N.W 2d 675; Geiger v Simpson Methodist
Episcopal Church of Minneapolis (1928) 174 Minn. 389, 219 N.W 463.
'Hewett v. Hospital Aid Association (1906) 73 N.H. 556, 64 Atl.
190.
" Welch v. Frisbie Memorial Hospital (1939) 90 N.H. 337, 9 A. 2d
761. Compare, Sandwell v Elliott Hospital (1943) 92 N.H. 41, 24 A.
2d 273.
'Sisters of the Sorrowful Mother v Zeidler (1938) 183 Okla. 454,
82 P 2d 996; Gable v Salvation Army (1940) 186 Okla. 687, 100 P
2d 244.
'Spivey v. St. Thomas Hospital, 211 S.W 2d 450 (Tenn. App.
1947) Cert. denied 3/5/48, rehearing denied 5/3/48.
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of the charity and exempt as to beneficiaries except for personal
fault in the administration of the institution. Usually the im-
plied waiver theory is applied as to beneficiaries. The Restate-
ment of Trusts takes the position that the charity shall have no
immunity as against suits brought by third persons but shall be
exempt, as to beneficiaries, if the trustee is not personally at
fault, in that he has failed to use due care in the selection of the
iiegligent employee or that other personal blame may be at-
tributed t9 hirM. 3 4 Professor Scott believes the Restatement rule
to represent "the clear weight of authority ,,35 Due to the
definite tendency of some of the courts to revise their views with
respect to this partial immunity, it is doubted by this writer that
the Restatement view will long remain the majority rule. Among
those states holding the charity liable to a stranger, but not to a
beneficiary except for failure to use due care, etc. are
Louisiana,36 Arizona, 37 Michigan,33 and New Jersey,39 the latter
state apparently malung no change as to immunity when personal
fault is attributable to the managers of the institution. The
jurisdictions giving the charity a very limited immunity have
either ignored or disposed of the various fictional theories except
the seemingly justifiable one of public policy Oklahoma at one
time placed paying patients in the same category as strangers to
the charity and permitted them to recover whether or not due
care was used in the selection of the negligent agent or servant,40
" RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 402 (1935) Comment g. " It is
immaterial that the person who was injured paid nothing for the
benefits which he received. The fault of the trustee may be in negli-
gently selecting or retaining incompetent employees, or in permitting
the premises upon which the trust is carried on to be in a dangerous
condition, or in failing to make proper rules for the operation of the
charitable institution."
53 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 402 (1939).
'Jurjevich et al. v. Hotel Dieu, 11 So. 2d 632 (La. App. 1943)(paying patient), Lush v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Com-
pany, 199 So. 666 (La. App. 1941).
' Southern Methodist Hospital and Sanatorium v. Wilson (1935)
45 Ariz. 507, 46 P 2d 118.
'De Groot v. Edison Institute (1943) 306 Mich. 339, 10 N.W
2d 907; Bruce v Henry Ford Hospital (1931) 254 Mich. 394, 236 N.W813.
•Fair v. Atlantic City Hospital (1946) 25 N.J. Misc. 65, 50 A. 2d
376 holding that hospital not liable to a patient for negligence of
managers; Rose v. Raleigh Fitln-Paul Memorial Hospital (1947) 25
N.J. Misc. 311, 53 A. 2d 178; Kolb v. Monmouth Memorial Hospital(1936) 116 N.J.L. 118, 182 Atl. 822.
"' City of Shawnee v. Roush (1923) 101 Okla. 60, 223 Pac. 354;
Carver Chiropractic College v. Armstrong (1924) 103 Okla. 123, 229
Pac. 641.
L.J.-S
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but later cases contain strong indications that a nonpaying
patient will be accorded the same protection.41 California ap-
parently had adopted the Restatement rule until 1939 when the
Supreme Court of the state had opportunity to pass upon the
liability of a charity to a paying patient, the court holding that
the charity was liable without regard to any failure of due care
upon the part of the administration in the selection of the
negligent servant.42
Since the dictum in the Heriot's Hospital case,4 3 liniformity
of opinion has been a goal to be achieved rather than a reality
Fictive foundations have been the bases upon which many juris-
dictions have grounded their decisions. Bemuddled reasoning
necessarily points the way toward confusion of result and de-
cision. It must be recognized that the trend in this country is
definitely toward uniformity of reason and result-toward
liability without qualification. Some of those states having un-
qualified immunity have taken the position of a qualified im-
munity or liability, whichever way one cares to consider the
problem. Other states, having a rule of partial immunity,,have
dropped the qualification and have slipped into the rule of
absolute liability the same as in the case of private corporations.
Insurance may be carried to protect the charity from any
possible drain on its resources by reason of actions brought for
personal injuries by either strangers or beneficiaries of the
charity The premiums costs are exceedingly low as compared
to forcing an innocent party to suffer a loss which occurred by
reason of the negligence of another. A wise public policy should
dictate that charitable institutions should be as responsible for
" Supra, note 32.
"
2Silva v Providence Hospital of Oakland (1939) 14 Cal. 2d 762,
97 P 2d 798, rehearing denied 1/25/40, wherein the court stated
that modern hospitals are rarely maintained upon donations of one
'charitably disposed person; they are a business enterprise, may re-
ceive some donations but generally depend upon paying patients.
England v Hospital of the Good Samaritain (1939) 14 Cal. 2d 791,
97 P 2d 813 where court stated in referring to Silva case, that "This
court has now decided that charitable organizations are not exempt
from liability for wrongs negligently committed by their employees."
In neither of the, above cases was the liability of the charitable
institution to a nonpaying_ patient specifically decided, although the
language of the court would certainly indicate an intention to ac-
cord a nonpaying patient the same protection. But cf Edwards V.
Hollywood Canteen (1946) 27 Cal. 2d 802, 167 P 2d 729.
"
3Supra, note 3.
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their actions as are individuals and private corporations.
Benevolence is a trait to be admired, fostered and attuned to
present day living. To insulate a charitable institution from
liability by reason of its character is a paradox of legal fiction.
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